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Executive Summary
On 7 September 2011, the European Commission issued its Communication on security of supply and international cooperation. Included were a set of proposals with the aim of improving Brussels' oversight on international energy deals between EU Member States and energy-rich third countries. The rationale for the new proposals lies in the difficulties the EU has in diversifying its gas suppliers and transit routes.
Europe's increasing anxiety over its dependence on Russian natural gas imports led to the idea for the creation of a 'Southern gas Corridor' to tap into Central Asia's vast reserves back in late 2008. Now, 3 years later there are no clear indications however that Central Asian gas will flow to Europe anytime soon, resulting in growing criticism over the way in which the EU has tried to secure alternative supplies. Some claim the myriad of individual Member State actions on external energy policy blurs the view of third countries on what the Union really wants and hampers its diversification efforts.
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Renowned human Rights NGOs also criticised the Union's 'courting' of Central Asian leaders and for not standing up against their notorious regimes. Democratisation and human rights promotion were seen to be at odds with the Union's energy policy in the region.
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This Policy Brief argues that the solution to some of these issues potentially lie in the making of strategic choices in ongoing supply contract negotiations, and a change in the way in which human rights promotion is seen to be related to the Union's diversification efforts given the fierce competition over energy resources in the region.
*The views expressed in this policy brief are the authors' and in no way reflect the views of the European Commission.
2 | P a g e In its current form, Nabucco intends to source initial gas supplies from Azerbaijan.
What is at stake is a 10 billion cubic metre (bcm) gas contract to be awarded in 
Moreover, Energy
Commissioner Oettinger admits that at a time of financial austerity measures it will be difficult for an expensive pipeline such as Nabucco to convince wary investors. 6 However, this is not Nabucco's only concern. Socar -Azerbaijan's national oil company -claimed it awards the contract only when it simultaneously acquires the right to sell its gas to the nearest markets.
Moreover, it is only pays for gas transport costs as if Nabucco were running at full capacity. Moreover, it is safe to say that after acquiring a gas contract, Moscow and
Energy and Human Rights
Beijing are unlikely to care much about democratic reform in the region.
Recommendations
It is clear that the EU's aim of diversification is faced with significant obstacles. Great difficulties exist in acquiring gas from either Turkmenistan or Northern Iraq. Therefore, currently
Azerbaijan represents the only readily available source of gas for Nabucco.
Given that the decision on the allocation of the 10bcm per year contract will not be taken before March 2012, and neither Northern Iraq, nor Turkmenistan can be realistically expected to guarantee supply contracts before that date, it is unlikely that Nabucco succeeds in sourcing an alternative to Azeri supplies anytime soon. Taking into account Azerbaijan's concerns with regard to Nabucco running at less than half its capacity, it is more likely that the final decision will be in favour of either the South East Europe-, or the TAP Pipeline which at a smaller capacity can be easily filled with the contract.
Yet, such a scenario does not need to be to put an end to Nabucco, nor Europe's aims for diversification in the long term.
What is important for the EU however is to be ready for such an outcome and that it puts it weight behind the best alternative 
